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This paper examines the decade-long economic slump in Japan during the 1990s. In the 
neoclassical growth framework, a fall in total factor productivity growth is expected to slow down the 
economy’s long-term growth. This paper’s findings based on the Malmquist index show that Japan’s 
productivity growth rate in the 1990s is not only historically low but also lags considerably behind the 
contemporaneous growth rates in other OECD nations. Building upon the Japanese experience, this 
paper considers policy responses to the current global financial crisis.  
 





When a number of countries pursued expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis, ubiquitous references were made to what had happened to 
Japan in the 1990s. In discussions of this so-called lost decade, the persistent economic 
slump was typically blamed on the weak demand. Inadequate fiscal and monetary policies 
were believed to have exacerbated such weaknesses. 1  The problems with financial 
intermediation in the country’s weak banking sector were also argued to have contributed to 
the slump by pulling corporate investment below its optimal level and hence, again, by 
depressing aggregate demand. 
However, recent studies increasingly question the validity of the thesis of sub-optimal 
investment. Ando, Christelis, and Miyagawa (2003) provide empirical evidence in support of 
the over-investment, rather than the under-investment, of Japanese corporations in the 1990s. 
Hayashi (2004) empirically verifies this over-investment argument by using more updated 
data from the Japanese National Accounts. These findings strongly suggest that demand side 
developments may account for business cycles but may not be entirely relevant for 
explaining the chronic decade-long economic slump. 
How would the over-investment hypothesis marry with Japan’s decade-long output 
slump? The neoclassical growth framework provides a clue. In the standard neoclassical 
model with exogenous total factor productivity (TFP) that dates back to Solow (1956) and 
Swan (1956), a fall in the TFP growth rate reduces the pace of the steady-state growth, and 
raises the steady-state capital-output ratio. This appears to be in line with a significant capital 
deepening and a decline in the after-tax rate of return that have been observed in Japan 
during the 1990s.  
A noticeable drop in Japan’s TFP growth in the 1990s is well-documented in previous 
studies, including Hayashi and Prescott (2003) among others, but they tend to invariably use 
                                                          
1 See Posen (1998), Mikitani and Posen, eds. (2000), and Krugman (1998), among others. In contrast, 
Katz (1998), Vogel (1996), and Carlile and Tilton, eds. (1998) emphasize the country’s structural 
problems in their discussions of the Japanese economy. 
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growth accounting in estimating TFP changes. The growth accounting approach implicitly 
assumes that all units of production are technically efficient. This may be a reasonable 
assumption for the U.S. economy which has led technological development and therefore 
been considered the world’s most efficient economy over the past half-century. However, 
most economies, including Japan, have tried to catch up with the U.S. economy most of time, 
although admittedly, they have demonstrated the world’s best practices in some areas. 
Subsequently, complete technical efficiency is not a realistic assumption for estimating 
Japan’s TFP changes. This paper thus uses the Malmquist index approach proposed by Caves 
et al. (1982) that allows for technical inefficiency in estimating TFP growth rates. 
In Section 2, this paper develops a standard growth model to examine the Japanese 
economy. Section 3 outlines the Malmquist index and its decomposition. This is then 
followed by a discussion on the data and estimation results in Section 4. The last section is 
the conclusion with some remarks. 
 
 
2. GROWTH MODEL 
 
The standard growth framework clearly illustrates how it was possible for Japan to suffer 
prolonged economic slump when the economy was plagued, not by under-investment but 
instead by excessive capital formation beyond the optimal level, as argued by Ando et al. 
(2003) and Hayashi (2004). This paper adopts a standard neoclassical model with a constant, 
exogenous saving rate that traces back to Solow (1956) and Swan (1956).2 The aggregate 
production function is assumed to be described by the Cobb-Douglas function, 
 
Yt = AtKt αLt1-α                                    (1) 
 
where Y is aggregate output, K is aggregate capital, and L is total employment. A > 0 is the 
level of TFP and α is a constant with 0 < α < 1. 
For simplicity, we suppose that the economy is closed and there are no government 
expenditures on goods and services. Hence, the aggregate output is either consumed or 
invested in this economy. Investment is used to create new units of capital which depreciates 
at the constant rate δ > 0. In addition, we assume that a constant fraction of the aggregate 
output is saved at the rate of s (0 ≤ s ≤ 1). We also assume that total employment grows at a 
constant, exogenous rate of n ≥ 0. 
Eq. (1) can be rewritten in intensive form as 
 
yt = Atkt α                          (2) 
 
where y ≡ Y/L and k ≡ K/L. 
The steady-state value of k for the given level of TFP, Aτ, is denoted as k‾τ , and satisfies 
the condition 
 
sAτ  k‾τ α = (n+δ) ⋅  k‾τ                                  (3) 
 
If k is below  k‾τ , k is expected to increase over time until it reaches  k‾τ. The growth rate of 
                                                          
2 For a more detailed exposition of this framework, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). 




k at t along the transition is characterized by 
 
k·t /kt = sAτ kt-(1-α) – (n + δ)                       (4) 
 
From Eq. (4), the growth rate of k falls as k increases and it approaches 0 as k approaches  
k‾τ. Using Eq. (3), the growth rate of k at t along the transition can also be expressed as 
 
 
                          (5) 
 
 
Subsequently, the economy’s optimal rate of growth in capital per worker at t depends on 
the distance between the t period level of capital per worker, kt, and its steady-state level,  k‾τ. 
From Eq. (3), k‾τ in turn depends crucially on the level of TFP, Aτ. For example, an 
improvement in TFP will raise the steady-state level of capital per worker when the 
economy’s saving rate, depreciation rate, and employment growth rate remain constant. 
Since a higher level of TFP would shift the country’s steady-state position farther away, the 
TFP growth is expected to increase the distance between the current and steady-state levels 
of capital per worker, and hence the optimal rate of growth in capital per worker. Therefore, 
the TFP growth has not only long run implications for economic growth by altering the long 
run or steady-state level of capital per worker, but also has immediate effects on the current 
pace of economic growth through its influence on the current growth rate of capital per 
worker. 
Using our growth model, we can now find a clue to understand how Japan suffered 
economic slump throughout the 1990s while it continued to over-invest. Suppose that Japan 
experienced a persistent stagnation in the TFP growth during the 1990s. Then, according to 
the model, it is possible that the country’s economic growth was languishing at a relatively 
low rate even with the over-investment because the optimum rate of capital accumulation 
had  become already too low, due to the stagnant TFP growth. In fact, our growth model 
indicates that excessive investment can temporarily boost capital accumulation and economic 
growth above the optimum rate, but then it quickly undermines future growth by accelerating 
the reduction of the distance between the current and steady-state levels of capital per worker. 
 
 
3. THE MALMQUIST INDEX APPROACH 
 
TFP growth is typically assumed to reflect technological progress. Technological 
progress includes not only innovations in both the products and the processes, but also any 
government policies and institutional changes that affect the position of the production 
function. This paper attempts to empirically measure TFP growth based on the Malmquist 
index approach. 
In the Malmquist index approach, a sample of countries is chosen to construct the best-
practice frontier using input-output combinations of the sample countries, and measure the 
distance between any particular observation and the frontier. This study draws on a sample of 
the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for 
building the best-practice frontier. In line with Shephard (1970) and Caves et al. (1982), we 
define the output distance function at t, Dt0, as follows: 
1





⎢ ⎥= + ⋅ −⎜ ⎟
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Dt0(Xt,Yt) = inf {θ: (Xt,Yt /θ) ∈ T t}                                                                                      (6) 
 
where Tt  denotes the production technology which is defined as Tt  = {(Xt, Yt): Xt can 
produce Yt at time t}. Xt is a vector of inputs at t, (Kt, Lt), and Yt is aggregate output at t. Note 
that Dt0 ≤ 1 signifies (Xt, Yt) ∈ T
t  with (Xt, Yt) lying on the best-practice frontier when D
t
0 = 1.  
Using the output distance function described in Eq. (6), we define the output-based 
Malmquist index for an individual country between period t and period t + 1 as3 
 
 
                          (7) 
 
A value of Mo greater than 1 indicates positive growth of TFP from period t to period t + 1, and a value less than 1 represents a decline in TFP. TFP growth as measured this way has 
some desirable features. Most importantly, the Malmquist index approach allows for 
technical inefficiency by building on the concept of the best-practice frontier. This is not the 
case with the Törnqvist-index formulation of the growth accounting approach.  
With the possibility of technical inefficiency, a country’s TFP changes may not be solely 
driven by progress in available production technologies – summarized as OECD best 
practices in our analysis – but also by the country’s capacity to keep up with the existing best 




                             (8) 
 
 
Eq. (8) shows that the Malmquist index can be broken down into two basic components – 
“technical change” and “efficiency change”. Each ratio inside the bracket on the right hand 
side of Eq. (8) measures a shift in the best-practice frontier estimated at the input level in 
each of period t and period t + 1, and the geometric mean of these two shifts represents 
“technical change” from period t to period t + 1. The first ratio on the right hand side of Eq. 
(8) represents “efficiency change” measuring the change in technical efficiency from period t 
to period t + 1. Subsequently, “efficiency change” determines whether production is moving 
closer to or away from the prevailing frontier, and captures the efficiency catch-up effect 
between the two periods t and t + 1. The value of “efficiency change” greater than 1 implies 
that the country has closed the gap of its production method with the prevailing best practice.  
 
 
4. DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
In order to estimate Japan’s TFP changes based on the Malmquist index, a sample of 
OECD countries was chosen to construct the best-practice frontier. The final sample consists 
of 22 OECD countries for which the data on GDP, non-residential fixed capital formation, 
and total employment are available over the period of 1980-2006 from the OECD.Stat. They  
                                                          
3 This follows Caves et al. (1982). 




Table 1. Malmquist Index, Technical Change, and Efficiency Change in Japan 










































































































include: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Among the current OECD member 
countries, 8 countries were excluded due to data unavailability; they include Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and 
Switzerland. 
Our measure of aggregate output is constant price GDP adjusted in 2000 prices. The two 
aggregate input proxies are total employment and the fixed capital stock. Total employment 
is defined as the number of workers, and the fixed capital stock is the cumulated and 
depreciated sum of past investment. The fixed capital stock does not include residential 
construction, and is calculated from gross fixed capital formation – adjusted in 2000 prices as 
well – using the perpetual inventory method with the depreciation rate of 10 percent.4 The 
fixed capital stocks and GDP of individual countries are all converted to U.S. dollars using 
the purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate from the OECD.Stat. 
                                                          
4 Alternative measures of the fixed capital stock were also calculated assuming different rates of 
depreciation. However, they provided a similar pattern. 
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Table 2. Average TFP Growth 








































* Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, the United States. 
 
 
For estimation of the best-practice frontiers, this paper employs the data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) approach. With the DEA approach, the best-practice frontiers are estimated 
by non-parametric linear programming methods. We assume constant returns to scale (CRS) 
as underlying technology and calculate Malmquist indexes. Variable returns to scale (VRS) 
may be an alternative specification of technology, but the Malmquist index is equivalent to 
the traditional notion of TFP under a CRS specification (Färe et al. 1997; and Ray and Desli 
1997). For calculation of indexes, we use DEAP version 2.1 (Coelli 1996). 
Table 1 summarizes Japan’s Malmquist indexes and their decomposed indexes, technical 
changes and efficiency changes, over the period 1981-2006. According to calculations of the 
Malmquist index, the country’s TFP growth slowed down considerably during the 1990s. 
While TFP grew at an average of 2 percent per year over the 1981-1990 period, it did not 
improve at all on average and often deteriorated during the 1990s. The geometric mean of 
Japan’s Malmquist indexes for 1991-2000 amounts to 0.999 which is less than 1.  
Table 2 shows that Japan’ TFP performance stood out in the OECD region in the 1980s 
as well as 1990s, but for different reasons. During 1981-1990, Japan’s TFP growth was 
particularly strong compared to the OECD average of 1 percent per year. However, the 
country’s virtually stagnant TFP growth in the 1990s was lagging conspicuously behind the 
OECD average growth in the same period. Therefore, a fall in Japan’s TFP growth during the 
1990s appears more striking against a backdrop of the OECD average performance. The 
extent of the slowdown becomes even more dramatic when Japan’s TFP changes are 
compared to the changes in the United States. Japan outperformed the U.S. in terms of TFP 
growth by an annual average of 1.5 percent points in the 1980s, but the country’s TFP 
growth fell behind that of the U.S. by almost the same percentage points during the 1990s. 
Table 2 also suggests that the Japanese economy was experiencing a rise in technical 
inefficiency in the 1980s, and this rising inefficiency was further accelerated in the 1990s. 
The averages of efficiency changes less than 1 indicate that Japan was on the trend of 
moving away from the best-practice frontier over those two decades. However, the country 
appears to have turned around and closed its gap with the best-practice frontier considerably 




in 2001-2006. Largely due to this robust improvement in technical efficiency, Japan 
achieved a respectable TFP growth of 1.4 percent per annum on average, over the same 
period.  
This rate of TFP growth was still short of the rate that country had managed to register in 
the 1980s, but significantly surpassed the contemporaneous TFP growth of the OECD area as 
a whole and that of the U.S. in particular. This remarkable turnaround in TFP growth over 
2001-2006 can be partly explained by various economic reforms implemented under the 
premiership of Junichiro Koizumi. For example, the Koizumi administration managed to 
sever the vicious cycle of “oikashi” – the practice of “evergreening” bad loans – by 
successfully putting an end to the non-performing loans problem. The prevalence of 
“oikashi” in the 1990s obviously dragged down the country’s TFP throughout the decade by 
hampering the much needed exit of inefficient firms which effectively blocked the entry of 





The estimates of Japan’s TFP growth based on the Malmquist index approach tends to 
confirm the picture painted by TFP residuals from growth accounting. The country’s 
respectable TFP growth with an annual average of 2 percent or more in the 1980s fell to 
virtual stagnation in the 1990s. The findings also show that Japan’s productivity growth rate 
in the 1990s is not only historically low but also lags considerably behind the 
contemporaneous growth rates in other OECD nations.  
From the perspective of growth theory, a fall in TFP leads to a reduction in the steady-
state returns on capital and a slowdown of economic growth. Therefore, the neoclassical 
growth framework suggests that it was the fall in TFP that was largely behind the great 
recession that lasted in Japan for a decade, even though any developments in the demand 
side observed during the 1990s may have been relevant for the country’s business cycles. 
The Japanese experience bears important lessons for the countries that have tried hard to 
stop the economic slump following the global financial crisis from developing into a long-
running recession. Any amount of government efforts targeted at the demand side is likely to 
fail to carry their economies to a sustainable path of growth unless they are accompanied by 
a meaningful improvement in TFP. Subsequently, the fiscal stimulus packages full of 
“shovel-ready” projects may prop up the economy just for a short period, but would never be 
effective measures for preempting possible “double-dips” or “triple-dips”.  
Against the backdrop of ever-widening recent sovereign debt crisis, it is time to 
completely overhaul the fiscal stimulus packages that have been hastily assembled in many 
parts of the world since the start of financial crisis. In both developed and developing nations, 
the governments need to design its spending more wisely with a high priority given to 
structural transformation that will improve the economy’s TFP. 
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